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book review
Mark Richard, When Truth Gives Out 
Oxford University Press (2008), 184 pages
by Isidora Stojanovic
Institut Jean Nicod - CNRS-ENS-EHESS
Richard's When Truth Gives Out, written in an engaging and accessible style, develops
around the  idea that  the notion of truth,  contrary to a lot  of received wisdom from
philosophy of language and logic, is not – or at least, not always – the right concept to
employ in analyzing belief, assertion, or their evaluation. The book is organized in five
chapters  and  two appendices,  all  of  which  could  work  equally well  as  independent
essays. In particular, Chapter IV,  What's the Matter with Relativism?,  largely overlaps
with his well-known paper 'Contextualism and Relativism', Philosophical Studies  119,
2004, 215-42. The choice of compiling those pieces into a monograph, rather than a
mere  collection  of  essays, is  motivated  by  the  fact  that  each  chapter  addresses,
sometimes  in different  ways and from different  angles,  the question of  whether  the
notions of truth and falsity are the core notions in the analysis of a range of phenomena
regarding thought, discourse, inference and disagreement. The take-home message of
the book is that if one is prepared to give up the centrality of the notion of truth –
whether one trades it for the notion of relative truth or, more radically, decides that even
relative truth simply isn't the right dimension to understand belief and assertion – then
one can start perceiving promising solutions to a number of long-standing puzzles from
philosophy of language, logic and epistemology. 
Chapter I,  Epithets and Attitudes, provides a fairly engaging introduction to the
matter, with its topic of derogatory terms and, more specifically, racial slurs. Consider
the somewhat démodé derogatory term for the French ´Frog´, and suppose that I point to
someone and say 'He is a Frog'. What did I say? Did I say something true, or false, or
neither?  Which  thought  did  I  express  (if  any)?  Chapter  I  deals  with  this  sort  of
questions, aiming at the conclusion that truth-conditional approaches – i.e., approaches
that take the notion of truth to be the central notion in the analysis of meaning – run into
trouble when it comes to accounting for the meaning of slurs, and of derogatory terms
more generally. Although no one holds that ´Frog´ is simply synonymous with ´French´,
a minimal departure from such a simple view would be to say that ´He is a Frog´ has the
same truth  conditions  as  ´He is  French´,  but  that  the  former,  unlike  the latter,  also
presupposes  a derogatory attitude towards the French. Similar in spirit, albeit different
in  detail,  is  the  proposal  that  while  ´Frog´  and  ´French´  are  truth-conditionally
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equivalent – both predicates apply to the French, and to the French only – a speaker who
uses ´Frog´ rather than ´French´ conventionally implicates that the French are worthy of
contempt (or  something along those lines).  Presuppositional  accounts,  of  the former
sort,  are  discarded  on  the  charge  of  “misdiagnos[ing]  ´how  slurs  work´”  (p.  21):
someone who is using ´Frog´ is acting in a contemptuous and hostile way towards the
French, rather than merely presupposing such a contemptuous attitude and “inserting [it]
into a conversation's record” (p. 22), which is what Richard takes such presuppositional
accounts  to  amount  to.  While  this  argument  against  presuppositional  accounts  may
appear  somewhat  elusive  and  thin,  Richard's  dissatisfaction  with  the  “pragmatic”
accounts, of the latter sort, which locate the derogatory character of slurs at the level of
conventional  implicature,  rather  than  at  the  level  of  truth-conditional  or  “semantic“
content,  is  more  substantial.  Richard's  worry is  that  such accounts  (and,  ipso  facto,
presuppositional accounts, too) fail to look beyond the language and its use. But slurs
are not merely a linguistic phenomenon: they reach beyond language into the thought
itself.  A person using a racial  slur is not merely implicating something negative: the
thoughts of this person are also infested. The way in which slurs infiltrate the thought is,
in Richard's view, a core problem that will elude any account whose analysis remains at
the level of language. Richard's own account is thus characterized by the idea that the
way in  which  the  thinker  represents  the  object  that  he  or  she  is  thinking  about  is
constitutive of the thought itself. My thought that a certain person is a Frog would thus
be a thought with a built-in contemptuous attitude towards the French, a feature that
distinguishes it from the thought that the person at stake is (merely) French.
Chapter I offers a novel, albeit somewhat underdeveloped approach to slurs and
derogatory terms, and, more importantly for the book’s main focus, puts forward the
idea that the analysis of thoughts expressed or entertained by a slurring agent overrides
the dimensions of truth and falsity. The argument may be reconstructed as follows. An
agent's contemptuous attitude towards the French is part of her thought that X is a Frog;
to think such a thought is to think badly of X (and of the French more generally). Even
if X is French, we cannot accept, or adhere or ascribe to, that agent's thought, because
that would imply that we endorse her contemptuous attitude. On the other hand, we
cannot unsubscribe from her thought either on the grounds on its being false, because
that would commit us to endorsing that very same contemptuous attitude: to ascribe
falsity to that agent's thought is to ascribe truth to the thought that X isn't a Frog; and to
think that someone isn’t a Frog is, again, to think badly of the French. Ergo, the thought
of a slurring agent can neither be true nor false. Truth gives out.
In Chapters II and III, Richard turns to a different set of problems. He considers,
on the one hand, the phenomenon of  vagueness,  and on the other, the  liar  paradox.
What is the connection between (complex) expressions such as the liar sentence, namely
“This very sentence isn't true” and vague expressions such as ´bald´, ´tall´ or ´many´?
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Why should  the  two  issues  be  grouped  together  and  treated  along the  same lines?
Although  Richard  does  not  try  to  articulate  the  connection  explicitly,  the  likely
motivation is that in both cases, a sentence that (arguably) cannot be true still seems to
“get things right.” The liar sentence denies its own truth and thus provably cannot true;
yet precisely in denying its own truth, there is something that it gets right. Similarly, a
prima facie contradictory sentence such as “Joe isn't bald and it isn't the case that Joe
isn't bald”, in a situation in which Joe is a borderline case of baldness, also seems to get
things right, yet one wouldn't necessarily want to take it to be saying something true. So
the puzzle is  this:  how can a person say something and be right without  ipso facto
asserting something true?  Richard's  answer to this  question is  that,  beside assertion,
which he thinks should be analyzed as commitment to truth, there are many other sorts
of commitments. Elaborating on such other sorts of commitments, he puts forward a
proposal whose central idea is that we can assess a commitment as appropriate, thereby
accounting for the intuition that the speaker can, in some sense, be right, without having
to invoke the notion of truth. 
A long standing objection to views that, like Richard's, hold that not all speech
acts are to be evaluated in terms of truth and falsity, is that they are unable to account for
logical  inference.  Consider  the  inference  “Joe  isn't  bald.  Therefore,  not  everyone is
bald.” Assume that  ´bald´is  a vague predicate,  and let  Joe be borderline bald.  If,  as
Richard holds, the premise in the inference cannot be the assertion of the negation of
Joe's being bald, but is, rather, a sui generis denial, how could he possibly account for
the fact that the inference at stake is a logically valid inference? Doesn’t validity have to
be cashed out in terms of truth and falsity? Richard suggests that it doesn't, and offers an
account on which sentences that serve as components (premises and conclusions) of a
logically valid argument need not be “vehicles of assertions”, but can be vehicles of
various other sorts of commitments, of which assertoric commitments are only a subset.
The trick is to analyze particles such as 'not' or 'if…then' as devices for compounding
commitments  in general.  “If Joe isn't bald,  then not everyone is  bald” can, then, be
viewed as not only a well-formed clause, but also as a logically valid one, even if neither
the antecedent nor the consequent are truth-evaluable. Evaluation of truth, in Richard's
account, is  just  a special case of a more general  and more basic type of evaluation,
namely evaluation of  appropriateness.  Even when  truth gives out,  as in  the case of
vague  expressions,  liar  sentences,  and,  more  widely,  all  kinds  of  normative  and
evaluative discourse, there is still a notion of validity to hold on to, based on the idea
that non-assertoric commitments can still be evaluated as appropriate or inappropriate.
The issue of vagueness is taken up again in Chapter IV, although from a different
angle. Here, Richard is concerned with the question of how there can be disagreement
over the application of a vague predicate, yet disagreement in which neither party is,
properly speaking, wrong. Richard's working example is Didi and Naomi's disagreement
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over the issue of whether Mary, who won a million-dollar lottery, is rich. Didi holds that
she is rich, while Naomi, for whom a million dollars isn't that much, holds that she isn't,
yet  there  seems  to  be  no  objective  way  of  adjudicating  between  Didi  and  Naomi.
Richard is aware that gradable adjectives are sensitive to contextual variations: if Didi
says that Mary is rich in a conversation about life conditions in derelict suburbs of third
world countries, while Naomi says that she isn't rich in a conversation about Bill Gates
and Donald Trump, then it  becomes easy to account for the idea that both Didi and
Naomi may be right. The gradable adjectives' dependence on the so-called comparison
classes  is no news, and can be assimilated, in a more or less straightforward way, to
familiar forms of context-dependence, like indexicality. Thus e.g. if I say 'It's raining' in
Paris, and you say 'It's not raining' in New York, we can obviously both speak truth. But
Richard  insists  that  the  phenomenon  that  he  is  interested  in  isn't  dependence  on  a
comparison class, and cannot be assimilated to any form of indexicality. For, he argues,
when the comparison classes are different, we loose the intuition of disagreement, to the
same extent that we have no such intuition if I say that it's raining and you say that it
isn't, but I'm in Paris and you are in New York. Indeed, Naomi might well accept that
Mary is rich relative to the population of suburbs in third world countries, and that, at
the same time, she isn't rich compared to Trump, Gates, etc. Richard's scenario is, by
assumption, one in which “the salient comparison class is the same in both cases (it is,
say, New Yorkers)” (p. 93). The reason why we can fix the comparison class and still be
unable to adjudicate between Didi and Naomi is that each places the threshold of what it
takes to be rich at a different level of the richness scale. Naomi's threshold is below one
million dollar, while Didi's is further up. 
Now, gradable adjectives' dependence on a threshold point in addition to a comparison
class (or a scale) isn't really news either: the idea can be traced at least back to Hans
Kamp, 'Two Theories of Adjectives', in Formal Semantics of Natural Language, ed. by
Ed Keenan, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975, 123-155. But, whether or
not  Richard,  noticeably  parsimonious  in  his  references  to  the  vast  literature  on
vagueness and gradable adjectives, is aware that the importance of thresholds has been
previously  acknowledged,  one  should  grant  him  the  insight  that  thresholds  and
comparison classes,  qua  parameters on which truth value depends, are not on a par.
While Naomi may consistently say “Mary is rich for the population of derelict suburbs
of third world countries, but isn't rich for the millionaires”, it would be odd for her to
say “Mary is rich for a New Yorker relative to a threshold set below one million, but
isn't rich for a New Yorker relative to a threshold set further up”. To put the same point
differently, one can be tall for an ordinary person and not be tall for a basketball player,
but one either is or isn't tall for a basketball player. Whether one is tall for a basketball
player requires, of course, fixing a cut-off point within the tallness scale (as restricted to
the class of basketball players). But once the comparison class is fixed, one cannot go
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on, it seems, playing around with thresholds (or, at least, not with the same flexibility
with which one can play around with comparison classes). So, summing up, when F is
an adjective such as 'tall' or 'rich', in order to interpret the claim that F applies to some
object X, one must first determine the relevant comparison class. Parties who disagree
whether X is F, while relying on different comparison classes, are only engaged in a
spurious disagreement.  This does  not  seem to hold for  threshold-dependence.  When
Naomi and Didi disagree whether Mary is rich for a New Yorker, the interpretation is
not at issue. Each understands what the other is claiming, there is no misunderstanding
of any sort, and yet, we seem to lack objective grounds on which to adjudicate between
them, to decide that the one rather than the other got the facts right. In a disagreement in
which neither party is at fault, again, truth gives out. 
But how can there be genuine, substantive disagreement that isn't cashed out in
terms  of  truth  and  falsity?  Richard's  answer  is  twofold.  First,  Didi  and  Naomi's
disagreement is substantive because they share all the concepts involved in the issue
over which they disagree, and, in particular, the concept denoted by the predicate 'rich'.
To illustrate the point, suppose that Mary is a dentist, and Didi says “Mary is good”
while Naomi says “Mary isn't good.” If Didi means to be saying that Mary is a good
dentist, while Naomi means to be saying that Mary isn't a (morally) good person, then
their  uses  of  the  predicate  'good'  arguably  denote  different  concepts,  and  their
disagreement  is  merely  verbal,  rather  than  substantive.  Secondly,  it  isn't  necessary,
according to Richard, that either of the disagreeing parties should get the facts right and
latch onto truth. In the picture that he proposes, there is a certain concept in place, the
concept of being rich, but the extension of the concept, i.e. the range of individuals to
which the concept applies, is not determined by the concept itself (together with the
facts). Rather, it is open-ended, and gets more and more determined as the concept starts
getting entrenched into a linguistic community. Richard thus writes: “Because 'rich' is
subject to accommodation, speakers in different conversations (...) are able to impose
different extensions (and thus intensions) on 'rich'; the result is that different speaker's
uses of 'Mary is  rich'  can have different truth-values” (p.  100);  “What a concept or
notion is a concept or notion of gets worked out over time via something like a process
of cultural accommodation and negotiation” (p. 116). In other words, accommodation
and negotiation are processes that make room for a kind of disagreement that falls in
between, on the one hand, merely verbal disagreement and, on the other, merely factual
disagreement,  hence  a  disagreement  that  is  arguably  substantial,  yet  overrides  the
dimension of purely extensional notions such as truth and falsity.
Richard's proposal in Chapter IV is interesting and plausible, though not without
gaps. One such gap concerns the methodology. Are there any criteria to decide whether a
given  disagreement  is  a  verbal  issue,  rather  than  a  case  of  accommodation  and
negotiation? And are there any criteria to decide which aspects of meaning are open to
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accommodation and negotiation and which aren't? While Richard doesn't lay down any
such  criteria,  he  implicitly  uses  some,  as  when  he  writes:  “when  variation  in  an
expression's semantics [is] not open to contextual negotiation, that variation affect[s]
what is said” (p. 102). But this is a very shaky criterion. According to Richard, when
Naomi says “Mary is tall” in a context in which the relevant comparison class is her
basketball team, what she really says is that Mary is tall  for a player of her basketball
team. But this does not seem correct: even in such a context, what Naomi says is, rather,
that Mary is tall, and that's all. Another gap is that the issue of what it takes for two
people  to  share  a  concept  is  never  really  addressed.  Thus  if  Naomi  considers  only
millionaires to be rich, why should we say that her concept is the same as Didi's concept
'rich'?  The  boundaries  between  the  cases  in  which  we  have  distinct,  albeit  related
concepts, and those in which there is a single concept, subject to accommodation and
negotiation, are as vague as the concepts under consideration. Consequently, whether a
disagreement is verbal or not, and whether it is substantive or not, are issues that cannot,
and should not, be settled in some objective, context-independent way.
The previous point isn't really hostile to Richard's overarching view. Indeed, the
proposal that he presents in Chapter V, Matters of Taste, goes in the same direction. He
is still concerned here with disagreement, but turns his attention to disagreements over
what is cool, who is hot or good-looking, what food is yummy, and so on. In Richard's
view, "judgments about what is cool and other matters of taste enjoy a double relativity"
(p. 132, my italics). Consider our disagreement one the issue of whether some person,
e.g. Ethan Hawke, is attractive. We can both give reasons and arguments that support
our respective judgments.  Our disagreement is substantive, yet there seems to be no
objective grounds to say that the one rather than the other got the facts right. From my
perspective, Hawke is attractive, from yours, he isn't, and the reason why it makes sense
to continue arguing about the issue is that our shared concept of attractiveness is subject
to accommodation and negotiation; we have, again, the same sort of relativity as the one
discussed in Chapter IV concerning disagreement over who is or isn't rich. But Richard
now  points  out  that  "not  only  may  the  assignment  of  a  truth-value  to  a  claim  be
'perspective-relative', but whether a claim is truth-apt may also be 'perspective-relative'"
(p.  126).  The  idea  is  that  in  some  cases,  our  respective  evaluations  of  Hawke  as
attractive are  not  so  much judgments  that  he is  or  isn't attractive,  as  judgments  (or
reports,  if  you  prefer)  that  we  find  him  attractive  or  don't.  While  the  proposal  is
compelling, it is somewhat unclear why it would only arise with judgments on matters
of taste. Why should it be implausible, for instance, to hold that Didi's evaluation of
Mary as rich might be of the same kind as my evaluation of Hawke as attractive? In
either case, the agent would be simply asserting her own perspective, to use a phrase
from Lasersohn (Peter Lasersohn, 'Context Dependence, Disagreement, and Predicates
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of Personal Taste', Linguistics and Philosophy 28, 2005, 643-686), rather than making a
truth-apt judgment to the effect that Mary is rich or that Hawke is attractive.
A more serious problem for Richard's account of disagreement, as well on issues
involving concepts such as 'rich' as on matters of taste, is that, as he has acknowledged
himself, "all the hard work is yet to come" (p. 123). For, Richard insists that when a
concept is subject to accommodation and negotiation, the disagreement is substantive,
and it makes sense for the disagreeing parties to go on disagreeing, to challenge one
another's evidence and arguments for the claims that they are putting forward, to try to
prove the other party to be wrong. In other words, the disagreement should allow for a
rational resolution; at the end of the day, the process of accommodation and negotiation
should result in having one of the parties emerge as the one that somehow "got it right".
But if truth has given out from the start, what else is there to ground the one party's
perspective as somehow better, or superior, or "more right", than the other's? Richard,
while fully aware of the issue, has preferred not to address it in this book.
When Truth Gives Out  is written in an entertaining, almost colloquial tone, with
most  of  the  technicalities  confined  to  appendices,  and  dry  argumentation  carefully
avoided. However, this “easy” style can easily prove to be treacherous. For, the thread of
argument is often elusive, and the precise reconstruction of the argument may require
considerable effort. What is more, the discussion is often sparkled with interesting and
provocative ideas, but whose role within the general argument is not always clear. Thus,
for example, in Chapter I, we find the idea that “whether a thought is true or false can be
as much a matter of the context in which it is asked Is that true? as it is of how things
are  independently  of  asking”  (p.  15).  The  idea  is  deeply “relativist”:  the  truth  of  a
thought  isn't  fixed once and for all  by what  the world is  like,  but is  relative to  the
context from which the thought is evaluated for truth; the same thought, evaluated as
true in one context, may be (correctly) re-evaluated as false from another. However, the
exact  contribution of this  relativist  stance to the discussion of derogatory terms and
racial epithets remains unclear. Throughout the book, one often gets the impression of
being presented with a patchwork of interesting, thought-provoking ideas, rather than a
single, unified and well-structured picture. But despite this somewhat impressionistic
character, When Truth Gives Out is rhythmed by a unifying motto, aptly captured by its
witty title.       
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